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“Foreign banker” once had a nasty ring to it, like “carpetbagger”
or “loan shark.”1 In the harshest terms, foreign banks were seen as
parasites that were out to drain financial capital from their hosts. In
nationalization campaigns, banks were often the first targets, espe-
cially when foreign owned. Even after a decade of privatization, gov-
ernments still own a surprisingly large share of bank assets (La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002). Bank privatization has been
held up, in part, by fear of foreign bankers who, in many cases, are
the only, or most likely, buyers.
In the United States, banks from other states were long viewed
as foreign, and most states strictly forbade entry by banks from other
states until the mid-1970s. Even banks from other cities within a
state were often blocked from opening branches in other cities in the
state. Loosely speaking, the hometown bank was local, and banks
from anywhere else were foreign.
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Times have changed. In the United States, barriers to entry by
out-of-state banks were gradually lowered across the states starting
in the late 1970s. The biggest U.S. banks now operate more or less
nationally, with banks or branches in many states. Nations around
the world have also lowered barriers to foreign bank ownership, and
foreign banks have entered aggressively. Foreign bank ownership in
Latin America increased dramatically in the second half of the 1990s,
with aggressive acquisitions by Spanish banks, in particular. In Chile,
the foreign bank share of Chilean bank assets increased from less
than 20 percent in 1994 to more than 50 percent in 1999 (Clarke and
others, 2001).
Generally speaking, the first-order effects of relaxed bank entry
restrictions have been favorable. Relaxed branching restrictions within
states in the United States have been associated with increased credit
availability, enhanced bank efficiency, and faster economic growth
within states (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996 and 1998). Internation-
ally, the benefits of foreign entry seem to depend on the level of de-
velopment of the host country. For developing nations, at least, foreign
entrants tend to be more efficient than incumbent banks, and the
stiffer competition seems to improve overall bank efficiency
(Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2001). Geert, Harvey, and
Lundblad (2002) find that broader financial liberalization—that is,
opening equity markets to foreign investors—is associated with faster
economic growth.
Interest lately has turned to the second-order, or stability, effects
of foreign bank entry, especially in developing nations where recent
crises have raised general concern about financial sector stability and
specific concern about bank stability. In contrast to the first-order
effects—where one might expect mostly benefits from entry—the sta-
bility implications of increased entry are less obvious. Several vague
concerns have surfaced. Maybe, for instance, fickle foreign banks will
cut and run at the first hint of trouble, whereas local banks with
long-term ties (or no place to run) will remain stalwart. Foreign bank-
ers may also expedite capital flight in the event of a crisis. During the
Asian crises, depositors did shift funds from finance companies and
small banks toward large banks, especially foreign ones. What if for-
eign banks cherry-pick the best borrowers, leaving the local banks
with the “lemons” and a risky overall portfolio? Evidence thus far
suggests that these concerns are unfounded. Goldberg, Dages, and
Kinney (2000) find that lending by foreign banks in Argentina and
Mexico during the 1994–95 crises grew faster than did lending byForeign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 243
domestic banks, contrary to the cut and run hypothesis. Looking across
a wider sample of countries, Levine (1999) finds that the foreign share
of bank assets is negatively correlated with the probability of crisis.
Our paper investigates whether foreign bank entry is associated
with more or less economic volatility, as measured by year-to-year
fluctuations in real GDP and investment. Financial crises are the
higher profile event, but business cycle fluctuations are much more
frequent and may be an important underlying determinant of finan-
cial instability. Our empirical strategy employs panel data, allowing
us to absorb unobserved heterogeneity across countries with fixed
effects. We approach the topic with a mix of theory and evidence from
both the U.S. states and countries. Our theory is based on the macro-
economic banking model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Morgan,
Rime, and Strahan (2003) use an extended (two-state) version of that
model to consider the effect of interstate banking within the United
States on business volatility within states. The main result is that
integration (entry by out-of-state banks) is a two-edged sword for eco-
nomic volatility: integration tends to dampen the effect of bank capi-
tal shocks on firm investment in a state, but it amplifies the impact
of firm collateral shocks. The net effect of integration on business
volatility is therefore ambiguous. The empirical effect, however, has
been stabilizing in the United States. Morgan, Rime, and Strahan
find that volatility within states falls substantially as integration with
out-of-state banks increases.
Given the useful parallels between bank integration in the United
States in the late 1970s and 1980s, we first review the theory behind
Morgan, Rime, and Strahan. We then review and extend their em-
pirical findings for the U.S. states, showing that banking integration
across states reduced volatility by weakening the link between the
health of local banks and the economy. As we describe in Section 2,
the history of U.S. banking deregulation sets up an almost ideal em-
pirical laboratory for testing how banking integration affects the
economy, because we can separate out the exogenous changes in bank
ownership using regulatory instruments. Section 3 applies a similar
set of tests to a panel of about 100 countries during the 1990s, but in
the cross-country context regulatory changes are not sufficiently com-
mon to allow us to identify the exogenous component of banking inte-
gration. Instead, we address the endogeneity problem by constructing
instruments that reflect characteristics of groups of countries in the
same region, with a common language, or with a similar legal sys-
tem. The resulting instrumental variables (IV) estimates allow us to244 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
avoid the problem that foreign bank entry may reflect, rather than
drive, changes in economic performance. In contrast to the results
for U.S. states, however, we find no evidence that foreign entry has
been stabilizing. If anything, the evidence points tentatively in the
other direction.
In our final set of tests, we show that the link between changes in
the value of a country’s traded equity—a proxy for the value of poten-
tial collateral—and its economy becomes stronger with banking inte-
gration. Foreign bank entry may make economies more unstable by
amplifying the effects of wealth changes; this amplification does not
appear to be outweighed by more stable banking. This result con-
trasts with the U.S. experience, where the dampening of bank capital
shocks made integration stabilizing, and suggests that the specific
environment in which banking integration occurs may determine its
effects.
1. FOREIGN BANKING AND ECONOMIC VOLATILITY
How are foreign banking and economic volatility related in theory?
Ambiguously, we think, at least if the insights from the interstate
banking model in Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2003) apply interna-
tionally. Morgan, Rime, and Strahan extend Holmstrom and Tirole’s
(1997) macroeconomic banking model by adding another (physical) state
and then investigating how the impact of various shocks differs under
unit banking regime, where bank entry is forbidden, and interstate
banking, where bank capital can flow freely between states. The im-
pact of bank capital shocks (on firm investment) is diminished under
interstate banking, but the impact of firm capital shocks is amplified.
The net effect, in theory, is ambiguous. Because the insights from
that model can help in the international context, we review the basic
Holmstrom-Tirole model and the Morgan, Rime, and Strahan exten-
sion below. At the end of the section, we discuss the applicability of
the model to the topic of international bank integration.
 The marginal effects arising from integration have to do with
how the supply of uninformed capital responds to changes in the sup-
ply of informed (that is, bank) capital. The intuition is pretty simple. A
banking firm operating in two states (denominated A and B) can im-
port capital from state A to state B if another of its banks in state B
has good lending opportunities but no capital. The infusion of informed
bank capital also draws extra uninformed capital. That capital shiftingForeign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 245
immunizes firms in state B from bank capital shocks to some extent.
Firms are more exposed to collateral shocks, however. An interstate
banking firm will shift lending to state A if firms in state B suffer
collateral damage. The loss of informed bank capital also causes capi-
tal flight by uninformed lenders, more so than in a unit banking ar-
rangement. Hence, collateral shocks get amplified.
1.1 The Holmstrom-Tirole Model
The Holmstrom-Tirole model is an elegant synthesis of various
strands of the macroeconomic and intermediation literature. Banks,
or intermediaries generally, matter because their monitoring of firms’
activities reduces moral hazard—such as shirking and perquisite con-
sumption—by firm owners. Knowing that intermediaries are moni-
toring the firms also increases access to capital from uninformed
savers. Bankers are prone to moral hazard as well; they will shirk
monitoring unless they have sufficient stake in the firm’s outcome to
justify the monitoring costs. In the end, the level of firm investment
spending on projects with given fundamentals depends on the level of
bank and firm capital. Negative shocks to either kind of capital are
contractionary, naturally, but the contractions are amplified through
their effects on the supply of uninformed capital. The reduction in
capital that can be invested in the firm by the bank and by the entre-
preneur reduce the maximum amount of future income that the firm
can pledge to uninformed investors (without distorting the firms’ in-
centives). The decrease in the pledgeable income reduces the supply
of uninformed capital available to the firm.
1.2 Interstate Banking
Morgan, Rime, and Strahan extend the Holmstrom-Tirole model
by adding another (physical) state. We assume that bank capital is
completely mobile across states under interstate banking and com-
pletely immobile across states under unit banking. Foreign entry, in
other words, is completely prohibited. Even if we relax this restric-
tion, the results remain similar as long as informed capital is rela-
tively less mobile under unit banking. The return on uninformed
capital is exogenous and equal across states in either regime. That
makes sense in the United States, where savers have access to a
national securities market even under unit banking. That assump-
tion is arguable in the international context, but we stick with it for246 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
now. The key results from that extended model are stated and dis-
cussed below.
Proposition 1: The negative impact of a bank capital crunch in
state A on the amount of uninformed and informed capital invested
in state A is smaller with interstate banking than with unit banking.
A capital crunch in state A, for instance, will attract bank capital
from state B, so firm investment in state A falls less than it would
under unit banking. Because firm investment falls less, the maxi-
mum income they can pledge to informed investors falls by less than
under unit banking; hence there is a smaller reduction in the amount
of uninformed capital that firms in state A can attract.
Proposition 2: The negative impact of a collateral squeeze on the
amount of uninformed and informed capital invested is larger under
interstate banking than under unit banking. With interstate bank-
ing, for example, the decreased return on bank capital following a
collateral squeeze causes bank capital to migrate from state A (where
the initial downturn occurred) to state B (which is integrated with
state A). The bank capital flight from state A reduces investment by
firms in that state, which in turn reduces the maximum pledgeable
income firms can credibly promise to uninformed investors. The sup-
ply of uninformed capital to firms in state A falls as a result. These
amplifying effects are absent under unit banking because bank capi-
tal is immobile across states under that regime.
In sum, cross-state banking amplifies the effects of local shocks to
entrepreneurial wealth because bank capital chases the highest re-
turn. Capital flows in when collateral is high and out when it is low.
Integration dampens the impact of variation in bank capital supply.
This source of instability becomes less important because entrepre-
neurs are less dependent on local sources of funding in an integrated
market since bank capital can be imported from other states.
1.3 Applying the Holmstrom-Tirole
Model Internationally
The intuition from the interstate banking model in Morgan, Rime,
and Strahan (2003) is helpful in thinking about how international
banking should affect volatility within nations. In fact, the model may
fit better internationally. The distinction between informed and un-
informed capital seems more germane with the distances involved
in international lending than with interstate lending in the United
States. The flights of uninformed capital in the model may describeForeign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 247
international capital flows in the 1980s and 1990s better than inter-
state capital flow in the United States in the 1970s.
Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), in their historical study of finan-
cial globalization, offer anecdotal evidence consistent with the role of
informed capital (bank capital) in allowing leverage using uninformed
capital. “That overseas investors appreciated... [this] monitoring is
evident in the willingness of Scottish savers to make deposit with
British branches of Australian banks, and in the willingness of Brit-
ish investors... to place deposits with Argentine banks” (p. 9). They
also note the strict appetite for more monitorable, collateralizable
claims by foreign investors. Railways were a favorite, for example,
because investors (or their monitors) could easily verify how much
track had been laid, and the track was staked down once it was laid.
2. BANK INTEGRATION AND BUSINESS VOLATILITY
IN U.S. STATES
The United States once had essentially fifty little banking sys-
tems, one per state. The U.S. banking system is now much more
national, however, twenty-five years after states began permitting
entry by out-of-state banks. Entry by out-of-state banks is not exactly
the same as foreign bank entry, but they are not completely differ-
ent, either. The parallels are close enough to revisit what Morgan,
Rime, and Strahan find in their U.S. study before we turn to the
international data. To maintain the parallels, the U.S. regressions
reported in this section are specified as closely as possible to those
estimated with international data. For the United States, we still
find a negative correlation between out-of-state bank share and within-
state business volatility. Consistent with that result and also with
the model, we find that as bank integration increases, the (positive)
link between bank capital growth and business gets weaker. We con-
clude that bank integration, and the resulting immunization from
bank capital shocks, has had a stabilizing effect on state business
volatility in the United States.
2.1 A Brief History of Interstate Banking in
the United States
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 essentially gave states the
right to block entry by out-of-state banks or bank holding companies.248 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
States also had the right to allow entry, but none did until Maine
passed a law in 1978 inviting entry or acquisitions by bank holding
companies from other states so long as Maine banks were welcomed
into the other states. No states reciprocated until 1982, when Alaska,
Massachusetts, and New York passed similar laws.2 Other states fol-
lowed suit, and by 1992, all but one state (Hawaii) allowed reciprocal
entry.3 This state-level deregulation was codified at the national level
in 1994, with the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Effi-
ciency Act. That act made interstate banking mandatory (that is, states
could no longer block entry) and made interstate branching optional
(according to state wishes).4
Because states did not deregulate all at once, and because the
resulting entry proceeded at different rates, integration happened in
“waves” across states. The differences across states and across time
provide the cross-sectional and temporal variation that we need to
identify the effects of integration within states. The deregulatory
events make useful instruments for identifying the exogenous com-
ponent of integration (since actual entry may be endogenous with
respect to volatility).5
2.2 U.S. Data and Empirical Strategy
Our bank integration measure equals the share of total bank as-
sets in a state that are owned by out-of-state bank holding companies
(that is, bank holding companies that also own bank assets in other
states or countries). To take a simple example, if a state had one
stand-alone bank and one affiliated bank of equal size, bank integra-
tion for that state would equal one-half. We compute our integration
2. As part of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, federal
legislators amended the Bank Holding Company Act to allow failed banks and
thrifts to be acquired by any bank holding company, regardless of state laws (see,
for example, Kane, 1996; Kroszner and Strahan, 1999).
3. State-level deregulation of restrictions on branching also occurred widely
during the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s.
4. The Reigle-Neal Act permitted states to opt out of interstate branching, but
only Texas and Montana chose to do so. Other states, however, protected their
banks by forcing entrants to buy their way into the market.
5. While we focus here on interstate banking, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996)
report that state-level growth accelerated following branching deregulation;
Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) show that branching deregulation led to improved
efficiency in banking.Foreign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 249
variables using the Reports of Income and Condition (or Call Reports)
filed by U.S. banks. Our sample starts in 1976 and ends in 1994.6
We measure business volatility using the year-to-year deviations
in state i employment growth around the expected growth for state i
(over the 1976–94 period) in year t. To estimate expected growth, we
first regress employment growth on a set of time fixed effects, a set
of state fixed effects, an indicator equal to 1 after interstate deregula-
tion, and our measure of state-level banking concentration (defined
below).7 The residual from this first-stage regression is our measure
of the deviation from expected growth for each state and year. We
take the square or absolute value of this deviation as our volatility
measure.
The mean of our integration measure over all state-years was
0.34, rising from under 0.1 in 1976 to about 0.6 by 1994 (table 1).
Employment grew 2.3 percent per year, on average, over the sample
of state-years. The squared deviation of employment growth from its
mean averaged 0.03 percent. The absolute value of deviations in
employment growth averaged 1.3 percent.
6. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, passed
that year, makes our integration measure incalculable by allowing banks to con-
solidate their operations within a single bank. We thus lose the ability to keep
track of bank assets by state and year after 1994.
7. Business investment would be preferable (in terms of the model), but
state-level investment data are not available for the U.S. states (although we do
have such data for the international analysis). Our employment series is the best
proxy for overall state economic activity, however.
Standard
Summary statistic N Mean deviation
Share of state bank assets owned by multi-state bank 931 0.34 0.28
holding companies (banking integration)
Employment growth 931 0.023 0.023
Squared deviation of employment growth from expected 931 0.0003 0.0006
employment growth
Absolute deviation of employment growth from expected 931 0.013 0.012
employment growth
Share of state bank assets held by three largest banks 931 0.376 0.210
(banking concentration)
Table 1. Summary Statistics for U.S. State-Level Panel Data,
1976 to 1994250 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
2.3 Other Controls and Instruments
We also use banking sector concentration in our regressions, al-
though it is not an element of the model. Bank-level studies for the
United States find that bank risk taking tends to increase as concen-
tration (and the associated rents, or bank charter value) falls.8 Safer
banks may translate into safer—that is, less volatile—economies (al-
beit slower growing ones; see Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996). Bank
concentration will also likely affect the political game determining
the barriers to out-of-state (or foreign) banking. The rents and ineffi-
ciencies associated with concentration will attract new entrants, but
of course, the rents provide incumbents with the incentives and funds
to defend barriers.9 For the United States, Kroszner and Strahan
(1999) find that states with more concentrated banking sectors were
faster to lower barriers to in-state banks that simply wanted to branch
into other cities. Since concentration may matter directly for volatil-
ity, as well as indirectly through its effect on deregulation, we use it
both as an instrument and as a control (in some cases). Concentra-
tion is measured by the share of assets held by the largest three
banks (table 1).
The rate of integration could depend, in part, on volatility. For
example, banks may be more likely to enter a state after a sharp
downturn (when volatility is high) to buy up bank assets cheaply. To
exclude this endogenous element of integration, we use two instru-
ments based on regulatory changes: an indicator variable for whether
a state has passed an interstate banking agreement with other states;
and a continuous variable equal to zero before interstate banking and
equal to the log of the number of years that have elapsed since a
state entered an interstate banking arrangement with other states.
Our third (potential) instrument is banking concentration in each
state, although we use that variable selectively (as identified in the
table notes).10 All the specifications include year dummy variables
and state dummies.
8. On the relationship between charter value and risk, see Keeley (1990);
Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996); Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000);
and Bergstresser (2001).
9. This may explain why interstate deregulation began in a reciprocal man-
ner: state A would open its borders to state B only if state B reciprocated.
10. Both regulatory instruments have very strong explanatory power in the
first-stage models. These regressions are available on request.Foreign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 251
2.4 Results
All the coefficients on integration are negative and statistically
significant (see table 2). The IV coefficient estimates are much larger
than the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, implying that the
stabilizing influence of integration is larger (if less precisely estimated)
when we parcel out the endogenous component of integration.11 The
magnitudes are economically important. For example, the average
share of a state’s assets held by multi-state bank holding companies
rose by about 0.5 between 1976 and 1994. According to our regression
coefficients in the OLS model, the 0.5 increase in integration across
states was associated with 0.4 percentage point decline in business
volatility (table 2, column 5). The exogenous component of the in-
crease in integration—that is, the increase stemming from deregula-
tion—was about 0.25 over the sample.12 Even with this smaller
measure, we would still conclude that integration led to a 0.5 per-
centage point decline in volatility, a large drop relative to the uncon-
ditional mean for business volatility of 1.3 percent.
Our model suggests that the stabilizing effects of integration arise
because of better diversification against bank capital shocks. If capi-
tal falls in state A, affiliated banks in state B will be happy to supply
more to take advantage of good investment opportunities. The link
between bank capital growth and business growth within a state
should thus weaken as integration increases, which it does (table 3).
Bank capital and state employment growth are positively correlated,
but the correlation weakens as integration increases. If we take the
case of the level of integration at the beginning of our sample (0.1),
the coefficients suggest that a one standard deviation increase in bank
capital growth (0.084) would be associated with an increase in em-
ployment growth of 1.3 percent. In contrast, based on the mean level
11. One might object that interstate banking deregulation itself may be par-
tially determined by the volatility of a state’s business cycle. For example, political
pressure for opening a state’s banking system to out-of-state competition may
intensify during economic downturns (when volatility is high). To rule out the
possibility that endogenous deregulation drives our IV results, we have also esti-
mated the model after dropping the three years just prior to deregulation as well
as the year of deregulation itself. In these specifications, the coefficient increases
in magnitude (that is, becomes more negative), and its statistical significance
increases across all three measures of volatility.
12. We report a Hausman specification test in table 2 comparing the OLS and
IV models. This test fails to reject the hypothesis that the two models differ,
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Table 3. Response of U.S. State Employment Growth to Local
Bank Capital Shocks, 1976 to 1994a
a. All regressions contain both year and state fixed effects. Banking integration equals the share of a state’s bank
assets that are owned by multi-state bank holding companies. In the IV models, the instrumental variables are
an indicator equal to 1 after a state allows out-of-state bank holding companies to purchase their banks, and the
log of the number of years that have elapsed since this regulatory change. The sample includes the District of
Columbia but not South Dakota or Delaware; the latter two states are dropped because their banking systems are
dominated by national credit card banks. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Dependent variable
Employment growth
Explanatory variable (1) (2)




Growth in state bank capital * banking integration –0.2127*
(0.0236)
Summary statistic
Within R2 0.5001 0.5435
No. observations 931 931
No. states 49 49
Estimation technique OLS IV
of integration at the end of our sample (0.6), a one standard deviation
increase in capital would be associated with an increase in employ-
ment of just 0.4 percent.13
2.5 Thinking Globally
Our analysis of U.S. data suggests quite strongly that bank inte-
gration across states had a stabilizing influence on economic activity
within states. The regulatory history of state-level deregulation over a
relatively long period offers an almost ideal way to explore integration’s
effects on business cycles, because we can sort out integration stem-
ming from endogenous forces—such as banks’ appetite to enter new
states when the incumbent banks are weak—from integration
13. Peek and Rosengren (2000) find that when Japanese banks faced finan-
cial difficulties in the 1990s, they reduced their lending in California, leading to a
decline in credit availability there. This finding is consistent with our results,
although it emphasizes the downside of integration. While integration insulates
an economy from shocks to its own banks, it simultaneously exposes an economy
to banking shocks from the outside.254 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
stemming from policy changes. We also have accurate and consistent
measures of both state-level economic activity and banking integra-
tion over a long span of time. This long, balanced panel lets us absorb
all sorts of confounding variables by including year and state fixed
effects. Even without these fixed effects, of course, confounding omit-
ted variables are much less of a problem when comparing New York
and New Mexico than when comparing Chile and China. Cross-coun-
try studies also suffer from measurement problems for observable
variables, particularly the measure of integration (described below).
But how general are the state-level results? Do the good experi-
ences of U.S. states translate naturally into good experiences when
emerging economies open their markets to foreign banks? Clearly,
the environments differ substantially. For example, the United States
has a well-developed financial market and a legal system that makes
contract writing and enforcement relatively easy. In emerging econo-
mies, explicit contracting is more difficult. Collateral shocks may there-
fore matter more outside the United States, where weaker contract
enforcement makes lenders insist on higher collateral requirements
or, more generally, greater levels of entrepreneurial equity holding
per dollar lent (Eichengreen and Bordo, 2002).
The country experience with foreign bank entry also offers some
data advantages over the state-level experience. For instance, we
can measure both GDP growth and investment growth at the coun-
try level, rather than having to rely on employment growth. We are
also better able to sort out the effects of different shocks. As the
Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2003) model shows, the effects of bank-
ing integration depend on the relative importance of different kinds
of financial shocks. In the U.S. states, we showed that the impact of
changes in local bank capital declined as states integrated with the
rest of the country, but we could not control for shocks to collateral
because measures of these shocks are not available at the state level.
This omission is potentially serious given that the model predicts
that integration will amplify, rather than dampen, the effects of col-
lateral shocks. When looking across countries, however, we can sort
out these two kinds of shocks by observing changes in the market
value of all traded equity in the stock market (a proxy for changes in
the value of collateral or entrepreneurial wealth) and, at the same
time, measuring change in the health (capital) of the country’s bank-
ing system.Foreign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 255
3. INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
We now consider how banking integration affects business cycles
using countries rather than states. We use a similar empirical speci-
fication, although we do exploit data advantages where they exist.
The challenges with international data involve cross-country hetero-
geneity, the accurate measurement of integration, and potential
endogeneity between business volatility and foreign bank entry.
3.1 Cross-country Heterogeneity
Our panel data allow us to eliminate much of the cross-country
heterogeneity with country-level fixed effects. That is a distinct ad-
vantage of our approach over recent papers relating predetermined
measures of financial structure and regulation to subsequent economic
growth and stability (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2002; Levine, 1999;
Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). We were able to con-
struct a wide, though unbalanced, panel for nearly a hundred coun-
tries, albeit within a rather short time period from 1990 to 1997 (see
table 4). Many foreign countries began opening their markets to for-
eign banks during this period, however, so we do have enough time
series variation within countries to include country fixed effects.
3.2 Measuring Banking Integration and Volatility
We measure a country’s level of integration by the share of bank
assets held by banks with at least 50 percent foreign-bank ownership.
The series was constructed by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000)
using the Fitch IBCA Bankscope database. In contrast to our state
measure of integration, foreign-bank ownership share does not fully
capture the integration process because it does not include the ef-
fects of a country’s banks reaching out into new markets. Our mea-
sure of state-level integration did incorporate all ownership ties
between banks. This was possible with the U.S. data because all banks
during our sample operated within a single state, and for each bank
we could observe the identity of the banking company controlling it.
We were thus able to compute the share of banks in a state con-
trolled by a bank holding company with assets outside the state. In
contrast, the best measure of foreign integration—foreign ownership
of a country’s banks—does not incorporate integration in which banks
headquartered in one country own substantial bank assets outside256 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
that country. So, for example, a country like Spain, with its largest
banks holding significant assets in Latin America, does not appear to
be well integrated with the rest of the world. Despite this limitation,
foreign ownership is the best measure we have, and it probably rep-
resents the bulk of integration for smaller, less developed countries
that do not have banks large enough to expand internationally.14
Table 5 reports the foreign share data by year and region. The
data suggest large increases in banking integration in Asia, Eastern
Europe, and the nonindustrialized portion of the Western Hemisphere.
In contrast, Africa and Middle Eastern countries experienced little
trend in integration during the 1990s.
14. To partially account for this measurement issue, we also estimated our
models without the industrial countries listed in table 4. We find similar results to
those reported in table 7.
Industrial Western
Africa Asia Eastern Europe countries Middle East Hemisphere
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We measure country volatility on a yearly basis the same as for
the U.S. states, except that we consider both overall volatility in real
GDP growth and the volatility in growth of real investment spending.
For each series, we first construct a measure of unexpected growth
by regressing GDP growth (investment growth) on a set of time fixed
effects, a set of country fixed effects, our measure of banking integra-
tion, and the other control variables (described below). As before,
volatility equals the square or absolute value of the residuals from
this first-stage growth regression for each country and year. By con-
trolling for banking integration in the first-stage regression, we im-
plicitly allow the growth rate to increase (or decrease) as a country
opens itself up to foreign bank entry. This eliminates the possibility
of confusing an accelerated growth rate following banking integra-
tion with an increase in GDP volatility.15
Table 6 reports the summary statistics for our integration and
volatility measures across countries and time. For banking integra-
tion, the average share of bank assets controlled by foreign banks
15. The models in Aghion, Banerjee, and Picketty (1999) and Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001) suggest that the severe credit constraints in emerging
market countries may slow growth and increase volatility. Their models suggest
that foreign bank entry might reduce volatility via an efficiency channel, whereby
the increased competition resulting from foreign bank entry relaxes those con-
straints and thereby causes growth to accelerate and volatility to decline. Our
assumption of perfect competition even without foreign entry essentially rules
out a reduction in volatility via increased efficiency (Norman Loayza gets credit
for this point).
Eastern Industrial Middle Western
Year Africa Asia  Europe countries East Hemisphere
Table 5. Trends in Median Foreign-bank Market Share,
by Region, 1990 to 1997a
Percent
a. Medians are based on the percentage of each country’s banking assets held by banks controlled by a foreign
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equals 0.192. Real GDP growth averages 2.85 percent per year, with
an average squared deviation from the conditional mean growth of
0.43 percent and an average absolute deviation of 4.39 percent. These
measures of average volatility are about three-and-a-half times as large
as volatility in the U.S. states. Real investment has both a higher mean
growth rate and greater volatility than overall GDP growth. Average
investment grew by 7.68 percent per year, with volatility of 4.77 per-
cent (squared deviations) and 16.07 percent (absolute deviations).
As in the state-level regressions, we include banking concentra-
tion both as an instrument and as a regressor in our model, although
we vary the specifications because of the potential endogeneity of
concentration. As noted above, an advantage of the country-level analy-
sis over the state-level analysis is that we now can control for real
integration (as opposed to financial integration), equal to the trade
share of each country, (imports + exports) / GDP. Because the coun-
try-level data introduces considerable heterogeneity, we control for
the effects of exchange rate volatility by adding the absolute value of
Standard
Summary statistic N Mean deviation
Share of a country’s bank assets controlled by a foreign 498 0.192 0.222
bank (banking integration)
Real GDP growth 498 0.0285 0.0634
Real growth in investment 516 0.0768 0.1877
Squared deviation of GDP growth from expected GDP 498 0.0043 0.0141
growth
Absolute deviation of GDP growth from expected GDP 498 0.0439 0.0494
growth
Squared deviation of growth in investment from its 516 0.0477 0.0972
expected value
Absolute deviation of investment from its expected value 516 0.1607 0.1480
Share of a country’s bank assets controlled by largest 498 0.639 0.216
three bank (banking concentration)
Total liquid liabilities divided by GDP 498 0.525 0.344
(financial development)
Absolute value of percent change in real exchange rate 498 0.070 0.081
(terms of trade shock)
Imports + exports divided by GDP 498 0.388 0.267
(real integration)
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Cross-country Panel Data,
1990 to 1997a
a. Expected growth rates are computed as the predicted value from a regression of GDP growth (capital growth)
on a time effect and a country effect.Foreign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 259
the change in the real exchange rate for a given country relative to
the dollar. We also add a measure of the level of financial develop-
ment in a country and year (the ratio of total liquid liabilities to GDP),
following Levine (2003).16
As in the state-level approach, all regressions include both fixed
country effects and fixed year effects. The country effects are espe-
cially important in the cross-country models because they eliminate
many of the unobservable differences in economic conditions, institu-
tions, regulations, taxation, law, corruption, culture, and other fac-
tors that may simultaneously affect volatility and foreign entry.
3.3 Potential Endogeneity: Constructing
Instruments for Integration
It is perhaps even harder to argue that foreign bank entry is ex-
ogenous to economic conditions in a country than it is in the state-
level context, so instrumenting becomes even more important than
before. Our set of instrumental variables exploits linguistic, institu-
tional, and geographic differences across countries. The idea is simple:
a Spanish bank will be more likely to enter countries where Spanish
is the primary language; an American bank will be more likely to
enter countries in the Western Hemisphere; a British bank will be
more likely to enter countries with similar legal and regulatory insti-
tutions. Therefore, if American banks are well positioned to enter
new markets abroad because, for example, they are well capitalized,
then English-speaking countries experience more (exogenous) entry
than, say, French-speaking countries.
Accordingly, we first grouped countries along three dimensions:
primary language (Arabic, English, French, German, Spanish/Portu-
guese, and other), legal origin (English, French, German, Scandina-
vian, and Socialist), and region (see table 4). For each country, we
then compute the average of a series of characteristics related to the
likelihood that foreign banks enter a country in the group. We ex-
clude the characteristics of the country itself to ensure that these
group means are exogenous. The group characteristics include the
following: the ratio of bank assets to GDP (a measure of financial
depth), the average bank capital-asset ratio (a measure of bank finan-
cial strength), and the average share of foreign ownership (a measure
16. Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2002) find that GDP volatility and financial
development are negatively related.260 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
of how much entry has already occurred within the group). We also
include the size of the country’s banking system relative to total bank-
ing assets held by all countries in the group.
The results from the first-stage regressions of foreign bank share
on these group characteristics indicate that we are able to build a
good instrument for estimating the effects of integration in an IV
model, even controlling for country and time effects. For example,
the p value testing the joint significance of the set of instruments
excluded from the model in the first-stage regressions is less than
0.01. The regional averages turn out to be more powerful predictors
of entry than either language or law. Countries in a region where
banks are well capitalized, on average, experience significantly more
foreign entry than countries in regions where banks are poorly capi-
talized, on average. Entry is also higher in countries located in re-
gions with large banking systems (relative to GDP) and in countries
whose banking system is small relative to the entire region.
3.4 Results
Tables 7 and 8 contain the results for volatility of real GDP growth
for all countries and for nonindustrial countries in the Western Hemi-
sphere, respectively, while tables 9 and 10 present the results based
on volatility of real investment growth for the same country groups.
We report eight specifications in each table, four using the squared
deviations of growth to measure volatility and four using the abso-
lute deviations of growth. These four specifications include the fixed-
effects OLS and three IV models, one which includes the full set of
instruments, one that deletes banking concentration from the instru-
ment set as a possibly endogenous variable, and one that includes
concentration as a right-hand-side variable in the model.
In contrast to the U.S. experience, these results are consistent
with a zero or positive link between foreign banking (that is, banking
integration) and economic volatility. We do not estimate a single nega-
tive coefficient on the foreign bank share variable that is significant
at the 10 percent level or better in any of thirty-two specifications. In
contrast, we find a positive and significant coefficient on foreign bank-
ing in fifteen of thirty-two specifications. This positive effect is most
evident in table 10, which examines volatility of investment among
the nonindustrial Western Hemisphere countries. In all eight of these
specifications, the results suggest that greater banking integration is













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VForeign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 265
Tables 7 through 10 report the Hausman specification test that
compares coefficients of consistent (but not necessarily efficient) IV
models with the more efficient (but not necessarily consistent) OLS
model. The test never rejects the consistency of the OLS models.
Although the magnitude of the effects of integration do change with
the estimation technique, we never observe a change of sign in the
coefficient on banking integration in comparing OLS with IV. If we
look only at these eight OLS specifications, the coefficient on bank-
ing integration is positive in six of eight specifications, with statisti-
cal significance at the 10 percent level for five of these cases.
Why are country results so different from the U.S. results? Our
model suggests that integration heightens the impact of firm collat-
eral shocks on spending. Perhaps foreign banks respond more elasti-
cally to collateral shocks than domestic banks because they are better
able to reinvest funds outside the country. To investigate, we regress
the real growth of GDP and investment on proxies for shocks to en-
trepreneurial collateral (the return on the stock market in the coun-
try during the preceding year) and shocks to the banking system (the
growth rate of bank capital in the country). We then interact these
two capital variables with the foreign bank share.
The results (table 11, columns 1 and 4) confirm that the two capi-
tal variables are positively correlated with GDP and investment spend-
ing growth, as one would expect. More interesting is the positive
coefficient on the interaction between collateral and foreign bank share:
that positive sign suggests that the impact of firm capital shocks is
indeed amplified by the presence of foreign banks. The amplification
is much more pronounced in the investment regressions than the
overall GDP growth regressions, which seems sensible since lower
collateral value has a direct impact of firms’ ability to borrow.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The theory behind this paper suggests that bank integration is a
two-edged sword in terms of business cycle variability. Integration
can magnify the impact of firm collateral shocks because integrated
banks have the opportunity to shift their capital elsewhere during
downturns. Shocks to the banking system itself, however, become
less important in an integrated world because the integrated banks
can import banking resources from abroad to fund good, local projects.266 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
Our data suggest that the cutting edge of the sword depends on
where one looks. Bank integration across U.S. states over the late
1970s and 1980 appears to have dampened economic volatility within
states. That dampening suggests that the benefit of integration in
the U.S. has been to diminish the impact of bank capital shocks, and
indeed, we find that employment growth and bank capital growth
became less correlated with shocks to the local banking sector with
integration. Internationally, we find that foreign bank integration is
either unrelated to volatility of firm investment spending or posi-
tively related. That suggests that the amplifying effect of integration
on firm capital shocks dominate, and we do, in fact, find that GDP
Dependent variable
Real GDP growth Real growth in investment
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth in real bank
capital














Table 11. Response of Real GDP Growth and Real Capital
Formation Growth to Banking and Collateral Shocks,
1990-1997a
a. All regressions contain both year and state fixed effects. Banking integration equals the share of a country’s
bank assets that are owned by foreign banks, where the foreign bank must own at least 50% of the local bank. In
the IV models, the instrumental variables include the following: banking concentration, the average ratio of bank
assets to GDP in countries in the same group (groups are defined below), the average bank capital-asset ratio for
all countries in the same group, the average share of foreign ownership for all countries in the same group, and
the size of the countries banking system relative to the group. For each of these instruments, we construct group
averages, where countries are grouped along three dimensions: primary language (Arabic, English, French,
German, Spanish/Portuguese, and other), legal origin (English, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist),
and region (defined in table 4). For each of the averages we do not include the value for the country itself, only
the other countries within the group are used. In the IV* model, we drop concentration from the list of instruments.
Standard errors are in parentheses.








































































IV*Foreign Bank Entry and Business Volatility 267
growth and investment growth became more sensitive to changes in
stock market wealth, whereas the effect of shocks to the banking
sector did not change significantly.
Even though our model admits conflicting effects from integra-
tion, and even though our ancillary regressions (in which we interact
integration with bank capital or firm collateral) are consistent with
those conflicting effects, we are less confident about our international
results than we are about our U.S. analysis. The international data
are noisier, for one, and we have less of it (eight years versus eigh-
teen for the United States). Another concern is that our window on
the world—the 1990 to 1997 period—is partly obscured by sweeping
transitions and episodic financial crises, especially in emerging econo-
mies, that may confound the effects of integration, or may even mo-
tivate it. Fixed effects and instruments help with those problems to
some degree, but not completely.
With those qualifiers, policymakers and central bankers should
be aware of the possibility that business spending may become more
volatile as they open their banking sectors to foreign entry. The first-
order (growth and efficiency) effects of foreign bank entry are almost
certainly positive, but the second-order (volatility) effects are less clear.268 Donald P. Morgan and Philip E. Strahan
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